COMMENTARIES. ARTICLES 2006

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"PRAGMATIC HAMAS" -- NOT VERY LIKELY

By GERALD M. STEINBERG


Twenty years ago, they told us that Arafat and PLO were becoming pragmatic, and were ready to give up terror and make peace with Israel. It turned out that these hopeful predictions were wrong, but the same people are now appearing on radio and television, to declare that the leaders of Hamas will form a pragmatic Palestinian government. The odds that they will get this one right are not very high. Their optimism is based on the theory that when members of terrorist, liberation or revolutionary groups gain political power, they are forced to deal with the realities of the governing process. According to this model, the need to provide jobs, housing, health and education, and security will also require cooperation with enemies and neighbors, including Israel. This cooperation, in turn, is supposed to foster ideological moderation, and a transition from violence to peaceful coexistence. But like many appealing diplomatic theories, this one has a poor track record in the real world, particularly in the case of radical Islamist groups, such as Hamas. In Afghanistan, when the Taliban took power after decades of warfare and terror, the extremist mullahs were expected to become pragmatic. But instead of moderation, they converted their power into a reign of terror used to impose the most extreme form of Islam on the entire population.

The Taliban leaders never bought into the concepts of responsible government. And social services health, education and economic development were not high on their list of priorities. And instead of cooperation with the West, Mullah Omar and the rest of the Taliban leadership used their control over Afghanistan to provide Osama bin Laden with a safe haven and a base for operations. The same theory has been used to predict the transformation of Hizbullah from a Iranian-linked Shi'ite terror group focused on attacking Israeli and Western targets into a political party focusing on internal Lebanese issues. But in this case as well, the hard evidence has proven stronger than the soft theory, at least in the five years since the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Instead of ending its terror activities and investing more in social services, Hizbullah engaged in kidnapping Israeli soldiers, the deployment of 12,000 rockets, and in providing direct support for Palestinian terror attacks. So while Hizbullah pursues political power in Lebanon in parallel with terrorism, the declarations of leaders such as Hassan Nasrallah, rejecting all disarmament proposals, appear entirely credible. In the face of repeated failures, what accounts for the persistence of diplomacy based on wishful thinking, and the artificial dichotomy between political power and the use of terror? In part, it is what academics (realists, at least) refer to as "mirror imaging," in which Western diplomats project their own pragmatism and compromise onto leaders of terror groups from other cultures. The West has adopted an idealism that reflects its own history, including the tolerance resulting from the Enlightenment, and centuries of devastating religious and ideological warfare. But from this specific experience, the intellectual and political trend-setters have attempted to universalize the process. Europeans, in particular, place themselves at the vanguard of a universal process in which religion, ideology and nationalism have lost their power of persuasion. In the place of these dark forces of primitive human nature, Europeans see pragmatism, tolerance, reconciliation and compromise as being on the ascendant. So to gain aid, access and weapons, "revolutionary" leaders tell Westerners what they want to hear that they, too, share these goals. These factors helped push the Middle East "peace process" beginning with the secret Oslo talks and ending in disaster. Here too, wishful thinking presented an image of Yasser Arafat having made the transition from terrorist leader to pragmatic statesman seeking the best for his people. The mountain of evidence demonstrating that Arafat remained stuck in 1947 rejectionism was overlooked it was inconsistent with the messianism of instant peace.

Now, many of the same people who enthusiastically promoted Oslo are pushing for a political dialogue with Hamas, assuming that this group will take power from the corrupt and ineffectual Fatah faction. At the same time, Hamas is still planning terror attacks and continuing in its rejection of the legitimacy of Israel, regardless of borders. As in Arafat's case, Hamas leaders might reasonably conclude that they can receive recognition and control of the aid funds for the Palestinian Authority without disarming or halting their "armed struggle." If European and American statements about pragmatism and peace are more than empty rhetoric, they will have to link any further aid to the Palestinian Authority to ending terror and incitement. More broadly, the time has come for Europe and America to learn from the experience in Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq and with Hizbollah, and check their theories, based largely on wishful thinking, against the realities of the Middle East. Perhaps Hamas break the mold, and act like a European political party instead of a terrorist group, but at this stage, this is only wishful thinking. And such thin hopes are no substitute for realistic policies in response to the new realities in the Palestinian Authority, and the rise of Islamist extremism.

The writer heads the Program on Conflict Management at Bar Ilan University  and is the editor of NGO Monitor
 

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Iran's Redefined Strategy
By George Friedman


The Iranians have broken the International Atomic Energy Agency seals on some of their nuclear facilities. They did this very deliberately and publicly to make certain that everyone knew that Tehran was proceeding with its nuclear program. Prior to this, and in parallel, the Iranians began to -- among other things -- systematically bait the Israelis, threatening to wipe them from the face of the earth. The question, of course, is what exactly the Iranians are up to. They do not yet have nuclear weapons. The Israelis do. The Iranians have now hinted that (a) they plan to build nuclear weapons and have implied, as clearly as possible without saying it, that (b) they plan to use them against Israel. On the surface, these statements appear to be begging for a pre-emptive strike by Israel. There are many things one might hope for, but a surprise visit from the Israeli air force is not usually one of them. Nevertheless, that is exactly what the Iranians seem to be doing, so we need to sort this out. There are four possibilities:

1. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president, is insane and wants to be attacked because of a bad childhood.
2. The Iranians are engaged in a complex diplomatic maneuver, and this is part of it.
3. The Iranians think they can get nuclear weapons -- and a deterrent to Israel -- before the Israelis attack.
4. The Iranians, actually and rationally, would welcome an Israeli -- or for that matter, American -- air strike.

Let's begin with the insanity issue, just to get it out of the way. One of the ways to avoid thinking seriously about foreign policy is to dismiss as a nutcase anyone who does not behave as you yourself would. As such, he is unpredictable and, while scary, cannot be controlled. You are therefore relieved of the burden of doing anything about him. In foreign policy, it is sometimes useful to appear to be insane, as it is in poker: The less predictable you are, the more power you have -- and insanity is a great tool of unpredictability. Some leaders cultivate an aura of insanity. However, people who climb to the leadership of nations containing many millions of people must be highly disciplined, with insight into others and the ability to plan carefully. Lunatics rarely have those characteristics. Certainly, there have been sociopaths -- like Hitler -- but at the same time, he was a very able, insightful, meticulous man. He might have been crazy, but dismissing him because he was crazy -- as many did -- was a massive mistake. Moreover, leaders do not rise alone. They are surrounded by other ambitious people. In the case of Ahmadinejad, he is answerable to others above him (in this case, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei), alongside him and below him. He did not get to where he is by being nuts -- and even if we think what he says is insane, it clearly doesn't strike the rest of his audience as insane. Thinking of him as insane is neither helpful nor clarifying.

The Three-Player Game

So what is happening? First, the Iranians obviously are responding to the Americans. Tehran's position in Iraq is not what the Iranians had hoped it would be. U.S. maneuvers with the Sunnis in Iraq and the behavior of Iraqi Shiite leaders clearly have created a situation in which the outcome will not be the creation of an Iranian satellite state. At best, Iraq will be influenced by Iran or neutral. At worst, it will drift back into opposition to Iran --  which has been Iraq's traditional geopolitical position. This is not satisfactory. Iran's Iraq policy has not failed, but it is not the outcome Tehran dreamt of in 2003. There is a much larger issue. The United States has managed its position in Iraq -- to the extent that it has been managed -- by manipulating the Sunni-Shiite fault line in the Muslim world. In the same way that Richard Nixon manipulated the Sino-Soviet split, the fundamental fault line in the Communist world, to keep the Soviets contained and off-balance late in the Vietnam War, so the Bush administration has used the primordial fault line in the Islamic world, the Sunni-Shiite split, to manipulate the situation in Iraq. Washington did this on a broader scale as well. Having enticed Iran with new opportunities -- both for Iran as a nation and as the leading Shiite power in a post-Saddam world -- the administration turned to Sunni countries like Saudi Arabia and enticed them into accommodation with the United States by allowing them to consider the consequences of an ascended Iran under canopy of a relationship with the United States. Washington used that vision of Iran to gain leverage in Saudi Arabia. The United States has been moving back and forth between Sunnis and Shia since the invasion of Afghanistan, when it obtained Iranian support for operations in Afghanistan's Shiite regions. Each side was using the other. The United States, however, attained the strategic goal of any three-player game: It became the swing player between Sunnis and Shia. This was not what the Iranians had hoped for.

Reclaiming the Banner

There is yet another dimension to this. In 1979, when the Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini deposed the Shah of Iran, Iran was the center of revolutionary Islamism. It both stood against the United States and positioned itself as the standard-bearer for radical Islamist youth. It was Iran, through its creation, Hezbollah, that pioneered suicide bombings. It championed the principle of revolutionary Islamism against both collaborationist states like Saudi Arabia and secular revolutionaries like Yasser Arafat. It positioned Shi'ism as the protector of the faith and the hope of the future. In having to defend against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in the 1980s, and the resulting containment battle, Iran became ensnared in a range of necessary but compromising relationships. Recall, if you will, that the Iran-Contra affair revealed not only that the United States used Israel to send weapons to Iran, but also that Iran accepted weapons from Israel. Iran did what it had to in order to survive, but the complexity of its operations led to serious compromises. By the late 1990s, Iran had lost any pretense of revolutionary primacy in the Islamic world. It had been flanked by the Sunni Wahhabi movement, al Qaeda. The Iranians always saw al Qaeda as an outgrowth of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and therefore, through Shiite and Iranian eyes, never trusted it. Iran certainly didn't want al Qaeda to usurp the position of primary challenger to the West. Under any circumstances, it did not want al Qaeda to flourish. It was caught in a challenge. First, it had to reduce al Qaeda's influence, or concede that the Sunnis had taken the banner from Khomeini's revolution. Second, Iran had to reclaim its place. Third, it had to do this without undermining its geopolitical interests. Tehran spent the time from 2003 through 2005 maximizing what it could from the Iraq situation. It also quietly participated in the reduction of al Qaeda's network and global reach. In doing so, it appeared to much of the Islamic world as clever and capable, but not particularly principled. Tehran's clear willingness to collaborate on some level with the United States in Afghanistan, in Iraq and in the war on al Qaeda made it appear as collaborationist as it had accused the Kuwaitis or Saudis of being in the past. By the end of 2005, Iran had secured its western frontier as well as it could, had achieved what influence it could in Baghdad, had seen al Qaeda weakened. It was time for the next phase. It had to reclaim its position as the leader of the Islamic revolutionary movement for itself and for Shi'ism. Thus, the selection of the new president was, in retrospect, carefully engineered. After President Mohammed Khatami's term, all moderates were excluded from the electoral process by decree, and the election came down to a struggle between former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani -- an heir to Khomeini's tradition, but also an heir to the tactical pragmatism of the 1980s and 1990s -- and Ahmadinejad, the clearest descendent of the Khomeini revolution that there was in Iran, and someone who in many ways had avoided the worst taints of compromise. Ahmadinejad was set loose to reclaim Iran's position in the Muslim world. Since Iran had collaborated with Israel during the 1980s, and since Iranian money in Lebanon had mingled with Israeli money, the first thing he had to do was to reassert Iran's anti-Zionist credentials. He did that by threatening Israel's existence and denying the Holocaust. Whether he believed what he was saying is immaterial. Ahmadinejad used the Holocaust issue to do two things: First, he established himself as intellectually both anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish, taking the far flank among Islamic leaders; and second, he signaled a massive breach with Khatami's approach.

Khatami was focused on splitting the Western world by dividing the Americans from the Europeans. In carrying out this policy, he had to manipulate the Europeans. The Europeans were always open to the claim that the Americans were being rigid and were delighted to serve the role of sophisticated mediator. Khatami used the Europeans' vanity brilliantly, sucking them into endless discussions and turning the Iran situation into a problem the Europeans were having with the United States. But Tehran paid a price for this in the Muslim world. In drawing close to the Europeans, the Iranians simply appeared to be up to their old game of unprincipled realpolitik with people -- Europeans -- who were no better than the Americans. The Europeans were simply Americans who were weaker. Ahmadinejad could not carry out his strategy of flanking the Wahhabis and still continue the minuet with Europe. So he ended Khatami's game with a bang, with a massive diatribe on the Holocaust and by arguing that if there had been one, the Europeans bore the blame. That froze Germany out of any further dealings with Tehran, and even the French had to back off. Iran's stock in the Islamic world started to rise.

The Nuclear Gambit

The second phase was for Iran to very publicly resume -- or very publicly claim to be resuming -- development of a nuclear weapon. This signaled three things:

1. Iran's policy of accommodation with the West was over.
2. Iran intended to get a nuclear weapon in order to become the only real challenge to Israel and, not incidentally, a regional power that Sunni states would have to deal with.
3. Iran was prepared to take risks that no other Muslim actor was prepared to take. Al Qaeda was a piker.

The fundamental fact is that Ahmadinejad knows that, except in the case of extreme luck, Iran will not be able to get nuclear weapons. First, building a nuclear device is not the same thing as building a nuclear weapon. A nuclear weapon must be sufficiently small, robust and reliable to deliver to a target. A nuclear device has to sit there and go boom. The key technologies here are not the ones that build a device but the ones that turn a device into a weapon -- and then there is the delivery system to worry about: range, reliability, payload, accuracy. Iran has a way to go. A lot of countries don't want an Iranian bomb. Israel is one. The United States is another. Throw Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and most of the 'Stans into this, and there are not a lot of supporters for an Iranian bomb. However, there are only two countries that can do something about it. The Israelis don't want to get the grief, but they are the ones who cannot avoid action because they are the most vulnerable if Iran should develop a weapon. The United States doesn't want Israel to strike at Iran, as that would massively complicate the U.S. situation in the region, but it doesn't want to carry out the strike itself either. This, by the way, is a good place to pause and explain to readers who will write in wondering why the United States will tolerate an Israeli nuclear force but not an Iranian one. The answer is simple. Israel will probably not blow up New York. That's why the United States doesn't mind Israel having nukes and does mind Iran having them. Is that fair? This is power politics, not sharing time in preschool. End of digression.

Intra-Islamic Diplomacy

If the Iranians are seen as getting too close to a weapon, either the United States or Israel will take them out, and there is an outside chance that the facilities could not be taken out with a high degree of assurance unless nukes are used. In the past, our view was that the Iranians would move carefully in using the nukes to gain leverage against the United States. That is no longer clear. Their focus now seems to be not on their traditional diplomacy, but on a more radical, intra-Islamic diplomacy. That means that they might welcome a (survivable) attack by Israel or the United States. It would burnish Iran's credentials as the true martyr and fighter of Islam. Meanwhile, the Iranians appear to be reaching out to the Sunnis on a number of levels. Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of a radical Shiite group in Iraq with ties to Iran, visited Saudi Arabia recently. There are contacts between radical Shia and Sunnis in Lebanon as well. The Iranians appear to be engaged in an attempt to create the kind of coalition in the Muslim world that al Qaeda failed to create. From Tehran's point of view, if they get a deliverable nuclear device, that's great -- but if they are attacked by Israel or the United States, that's not a bad outcome either. In short, the diplomacy that Iran practiced from the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war until after the U.S. invasion of Iraq appears to be ended. Iran is making a play for ownership of revolutionary Islamism on behalf of itself and the Shia. Thus, Tehran will continue to make provocative moves, while hoping to avoid counterstrikes. On the other hand, if there are counterstrikes, the Iranians will probably be able to live with that as well.

 

Former Shin Bet Chief Avi Dichter squanders his integrity for shot at being a minister?

By Dr. Aaron Lerner                  

What did the jumper say as he hurdled past the 10th floor? "So far so good."

"The numbers speak for themselves. . . it is clear that disengagement has decreased terror" Former Shin Bet Chief Avi Dichter said yesterday as he praised Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's retreat at a press conference where he announced he was joining Sharon's Kadima Party. Dichter went on to say that there may be more retreats (aka "unilateral withdrawals") out of "security considerations." Shin Bet Chief Avi Dichter knew full well that one has to consider  considerably more than a few months of "numbers" in order to get an indication if the retreat policy is panning out. Sharon's team went into the retreat assuming that it would be possible to impose effective controls on the movement of people and goods between Gaza and the outside world.  After the retreat they succumbed to American pressure and the Palestinians now enjoy the final say on who and what passes through the border.

The international observers are only window dressing.  That's not speculation - its written in black and white in the agreement that the PA has final say on who and what goes through Rafah - and that arrangement is the model for the seaport and the airport. Shin Bet Chief Avi Dichter knew how the Palestinians would exploit this. Sharon's team went into the retreat confidently assuming that threats of a harsh unprecedented reaction to terror attacks emanating from within the Gaza Strip would serve to deter the Palestinians.  But that threat has already been tested and proven to be just as hollow as the threats Israel made when the IDF retreated from Lebanon. The vacuum Israel's retreat from the Gaza Strip created is being exploited today by all the Palestinian militias to prepare, train and arm for a round of conflict that could generate "numbers" of a magnitude Israel has yet to experience. In the last weeks we have already seen evidence how well the Palestinians have advanced on their "learning curve" - successfully tunneling from the Gaza Strip into Israel. Yes. Shin Bet Chief Avi Dichter knew full well that one has to consider considerably more than a few months of "numbers" in order to get an indication if the retreat policy is panning out. But politician Avi Dichter apparently has more important things to concern himself with than the truth.  Things like not offending the man who will decide Dichter's placement in the Kadima list or what cabinet post Dichter  will get if Kadima's performance at the ballot box comes close to its  performance in the recent polls. What a shame that a man who devoted his life to Israel's security should squander his integrity for a shot at a ministerial portfolio.

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NAZI PROTEST IN MUNICH 14th of January

By Jennifer Rosetto

On Saturday the 14th of January, 2 days ago, I was in Munich, Germany staying with friends and we were surprised by a Nazi protest in the middle of town - there was a strong police presence guarding over the event (all decked out in their combat gear) as well as a lot of the "punk style" youth and other civilians gathered against the demonstration. It was crazy to see this level of dissent in such an otherwise civil, quiet, and professional community. As a young American girl I was surprised to know the Nazi party is even still active at all at this level. Young and old Nazis gathered - shouting out over loudspeakers - as the punk youth wore t shirts and patches with the nazi symbol being destroyed and the people of Munich filled the streets also in protest.... these kids were as angry as the Nazi party; shooting their middle fingers in the air and yelling at them to go away. Kids laid down in the streets to stop the military from moving in to protect the Nazi party. The police were there as a human barrier between the old and new germanys... protecting the right to demonstrate and the Nazi's right to freedom of speech. The stores shut down and the event continued until nightfall, moving to different locations through out the city - and the police guarded them through the whole event. I took lots of photos of this event using an 8 mega pix digital camera to show my friends back in NYC the scene as entertainment... then thought maybe New York might be interested in this current event and the still active presence of the Nazi mentality and party in Germany. The party is currently calling themselves the NPD and below are a few links I gathered to quickly give you a background on their current activity in Germany.

http://www.npd.de/

http://www.expatica.com/source/site_article.asp?subchannel_id=26&story_id=16723

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3669974.stm

http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/0,1518,338323,00.html

http://www.amren.com/mtnews/archives/2004/09/farright_expect.php

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Palestinian conditional non-violence - denying the fundamental basis of the game

By Dr. Aaron Lerner                  

"We [me and Marwan Barghouti] support negotiations and other peaceful means with Israel as long as Palestinian aspirations may be realized through negotiations.  If Palestinian aspirations  can't be realized through peaceful means then the aspirations will be realized via resistance." Palestinian "moderate" PLC representative Qadura Fares on Israel Radio 27 November 2005

"The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process, and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations. ... the PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators." So wrote Yasser Arafat in his September 9, 1993 letter to Yitzhak Rabin, the Prime Minister of Israel. And it wasn't easy to get Arafat, acting as the representative of the Palestinian people, to sign off on those phrases. Words that forfeited any  possible legal claim to the right to continue employing terrorism and other acts of violence in what he and his supporters called a "liberation struggle".

Take a look at the phrase: Arafat didn't just renounce the use of "terrorism" - a word that the Arabs claim cannot ever be applied to their murderous activity - he also renounced the use of "other acts of violence". Arafat didn't want to sign off on the phrases, but Yitzhak Rabin made it clear that this was his red line. So there was Yasser Arafat in the summer of 1993: Arafat, essentially an aging has-been exiled to Tunis from Beirut, watching as each month Israeli security forces continued to whittle down their dwindling "wanted list" of terrorists. No. Contrary to what has become the story line in some quarters, it wasn't the "children of the stones" that raised Arafat from the dung heap of history, it was a group of Israeli ideologues seeking a way to facilitate an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Oslo was Arafat's lifeline. Israel could take it or leave it. So Arafat blinked first.

It wasn't a minor matter then. And it shouldn't be a minor matter today. Let's be clear about this: when the entire Palestinian leadership - from White House Lawn "man of peace" Mahmoud Abbas on down - explain that their commitment to nonviolence is conditioned on their getting what they want, they are trashing this fundamental Palestinian commitment. That's not to say that Arafat's letter and the agreements that followed it stripped the Palestinians of the ability to struggle for their interests. It just limited them to pursuing them via non-violent means - both on the domestic and the international front. Arafat's September 9, 1993 letter to Yitzhak Rabin committing to "a peaceful resolution of the conflict. . . resolved through negotiations" and assuming "responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators" was supposed to be a watershed event. But it wasn't. Because from day one that commitment has been ignored and forgotten.

PA on Terror: "Condemns" on paper, praises in practice
By Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook

The Palestinian Authority continues to speak about terror with two voices. In English, it publicly condemns terrorists when attacks are committed, but its pronouncements in Arabic turn terrorists into heroes and role models for PA society. In PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas's Arabic-language condemnation of Monday's deadly suicide attack in Netanya, his reason for this condemnation is significant: "President Abu Mazen stresses his sharp condemnation of this act of terror... Today's terror attack against civilians causes great damage to our commitment to the peace process," he said, adding that those responsible would be arrested. [PA Web site, December 5, 2005]. On the surface, that Abbas condemned the terrorist attack might be welcomed by Western observers. But it must be noted that PA political leaders have always been careful to specify that they're not condemning terrorism because it's wrong, but rather because it hurts Palestinian interests. In this case, Abbas's denunciation of the attack refers to the damage it caused the PA, not to the terror victims and their families. But even beyond this particular pattern of cleverly-worded condemnations, the policy within PA society continues to honor and glorify terrorists and turn them into role models. The case of the veneration of Fatah terrorist Al-Moayed Bihokmillah Al-Agha is a good example. When the PA opened the Rafah Crossing (between Gaza and Egypt) last week, many in the West saw it as a concrete step towards Palestinian statehood. For the PA, however, it was another opportunity to turn a murderer into a hero. Al-Agha was killed when carrying out an attack at the Rafah crossing, in which five Israelis were killed, in December 2004. The PA's ruling party Fatah features Al-Agha in a clip that glorifies violence and terror, and still shows the murderous attacks on its Fatah Falcons website a year after the attack. The American news network CNN's coverage of the crossing's reopening last month showed footage of a giant sign erected over the site, which declares the crossing's name to be in honor of the Shahid (martyr) Al-Agha, and refers to his murderous attack with the thrilling name, "Volcanoes of Rage." That the PA allowed such a sign to be erected at the site is a powerful message to Palestinians, emphasizing once again that terrorists are heroes.

[CNN, November 25, 2005]: On the sign is the emblem of the Fatah Falcons, a terrorist sub-group of the  ruling party of the PA. Also on the sign are the words: Fatah Falcons. The Crossing of the Falcon Shahid Al-Moayed Bihokmillah Al-Agha, Executor of Operation Volcanoes of Rage. Rafah Crossing 2004/12/12: The symbol, as well as an identical picture of Al-Agha, are more clearly  seen on the following image, currently on the Fatah Falcons' website. [Fatah Falcons Website, November 28, 2005]. Important Symbolism: The Fatah Falcons symbol is similar to many symbols found in the Palestinian Authority, including the official symbol of Fatah. It includes: 1 - a map of the entire land of Israel; 2 - a silhouette of weaponry; 3 - an image of Jerusalem's Dome of the Rock. Combined, these three symbols are clear in their message: The ultimate goal is the destruction of Israel through violence. The Dome of the Rock adds a potent Islamic symbolism. This message has remained essentially unchanged since the formation of the PLO in 1965. Honoring terrorism: This approach to creating terrorist heroes by naming infrastructures for them has long been a Palestinian Authority practice. Examples include: Summer camps sponsored by the PA Ministry of Youth and Sport named for suicide terrorists; A soccer tournament named for the suicide terrorist who killed 31 at a Passover celebration at the Park Hotel in Netanya; A girls' school near Hebron named by the PA Ministry of Education for a woman terrorist who murdered 37 and a  poetry collection by the PA Ministry of Culture named in honor of the suicide terrorist who killed 21 at a restaurant in Haifa. As long as the PA features exciting, terror-promoting videos on its websites, and names streets, schools, summer camps and tournaments after terrorists, its isolated condemnations of terror attacks - worded to placate Western leaders - will be long forgotten by Palestinians, while the infrastructures of hate and terror will last and reverberate. This leaves lasting impressions on PA youth and creates a new generation of PA terrorists waiting for another target.
 

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership - Israel's Perspective

Israel's Perspective on the Barcelona Process
Silvan Shalom, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs

A decade ago, the Barcelona Declaration stated that members of the process are "convinced that the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership". Peace, stability and prosperity for the Mediterranean basin are the declaration's main goals. Israel, in the spirit of the Barcelona Declaration, saw the Barcelona process then as it does today, as an important and a correct means to fulfilling Israel's long-standing dream. Our dream is to live in peace, understanding, tolerance and cooperation with all our neighbors. The road towards this goal is stated in the same declaration: dialogue, exchange and cooperation. Israel shares the new ideas and initiatives put forth and accepted unanimously at the Luxemburg Euro-Med Conference in May 2005, promoting political and economic reform, human rights and education, through concrete and measurable actions. Nevertheless, we feel it is necessary to return to the essential ideas that are the driving force and the raison d'etre of the Barcelona process. In our view, the Barcelona process framework is the ideal framework for breaking old stereotypes, misguided myths and erroneous beliefs between nations. In other words, it can serve to prepare the ground and the hearts for peace and cooperation.

Israel has recently completed its disengagement from the Gaza region as well as from four villages in northern Samaria. Disengagement was meant to be the turning point necessary to create a change in the stalled political process between Israel and the Palestinians. The momentum created by this move should be used in order to create a constituency for peace in our region. It should serve to empower the moderate forces and further isolate the extremists bent on continuing the cycle of violence. The Barcelona process can and should serve as the catalyst for as many projects as possible in those areas in which we can identify interests common to us all. Beyond the clear and immediate benefits of such projects, they can also serve as excellent confidence-building measures (CBM's). History has shown us more than once the ability of CBM's in promoting mutual understanding, tolerance and collaboration. Furthermore, the benefits of these projects are supposed to serve as tangible proof of the "fruits of peace" and to increase public interest in reaching the goals set forth by the Barcelona Declaration. In the last decade, Israel has tried, through its governmental and non-governmental representatives, to show the highest level of involvement in any possible cooperation. We are not starting from zero - Israel's participation in regional projects dates back to the first days of the Barcelona process : Within the political-security basket Israel is involved very actively in the Development of a Euro-Mediterranean System of Mitigation, Prevention and Management of Natural and Man-made Disasters project, which recently went into the implementation phase. Within the regional economic cooperation basket, in the framework of strengthening commercial relations with Jordan and the EU, we signed a Pan-European Accumulation agreement. Israel, the Palestinian Authority and the EU signed an agreement to open a Joint Energy Office and a Joint Transportation Office in order to establish common projects with EU backing. Israel's Minister of Communications participated in the first Euro-Med conference of Communications Ministers. Within the social-cultural basket, projects included: the Euro-Med Youth Exchange Program, the Medea program, eight projects in the framework of the Euro-Med Heritage programs. Israelis were also involved in education and training programs as well as in the EUMedis program involving information society. The highlight of this basket, in our view, was the establishment of the "Anna Lind Foundation" for inter-cultural dialogue. Israel was among the first supporters of this project and among the first to pledge financial back