COMMENTARY OF THE WEEK                     BY DR. AARON LERNER. World Jewish News Agency International Commentator and Director IMRA.

Palestinian conditional non-violence - denying the fundamental basis of the game

By Dr. Aaron Lerner                  

"We [me and Marwan Barghouti] support negotiations and other peaceful means with Israel as long as Palestinian aspirations may be realized through negotiations.  If Palestinian aspirations  can't be realized through peaceful means then the aspirations will be realized via resistance." Palestinian "moderate" PLC representative Qadura Fares on Israel Radio 27 November 2005

"The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process, and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations. ... the PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators." So wrote Yasser Arafat in his September 9, 1993 letter to Yitzhak Rabin, the Prime Minister of Israel. And it wasn't easy to get Arafat, acting as the representative of the Palestinian people, to sign off on those phrases. Words that forfeited any  possible legal claim to the right to continue employing terrorism and other acts of violence in what he and his supporters called a "liberation struggle".

Take a look at the phrase: Arafat didn't just renounce the use of "terrorism" - a word that the Arabs claim cannot ever be applied to their murderous activity - he also renounced the use of "other acts of violence". Arafat didn't want to sign off on the phrases, but Yitzhak Rabin made it clear that this was his red line. So there was Yasser Arafat in the summer of 1993: Arafat, essentially an aging has-been exiled to Tunis from Beirut, watching as each month Israeli security forces continued to whittle down their dwindling "wanted list" of terrorists. No. Contrary to what has become the story line in some quarters, it wasn't the "children of the stones" that raised Arafat from the dung heap of history, it was a group of Israeli ideologues seeking a way to facilitate an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Oslo was Arafat's lifeline. Israel could take it or leave it. So Arafat blinked first.

It wasn't a minor matter then. And it shouldn't be a minor matter today. Let's be clear about this: when the entire Palestinian leadership - from White House Lawn "man of peace" Mahmoud Abbas on down - explain that their commitment to nonviolence is conditioned on their getting what they want, they are trashing this fundamental Palestinian commitment. That's not to say that Arafat's letter and the agreements that followed it stripped the Palestinians of the ability to struggle for their interests. It just limited them to pursuing them via non-violent means - both on the domestic and the international front. Arafat's September 9, 1993 letter to Yitzhak Rabin committing to "a peaceful resolution of the conflict. . . resolved through negotiations" and assuming "responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators" was supposed to be a watershed event.

But it wasn't.

Because from day one that commitment has been ignored and forgotten.

 

LAST WEEK COMMENTARY

Framing Israel's Elections As Retreat Referendum Could
Defeat Sharon

              
While Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's plans to carry out a major retreat in Judea and Samaria after the elections certainly appeal to the elements in the Left now supporting his "Kadima" Party, the Israeli public overwhelmingly rejects his scheme. Turn the upcoming Knesset elections into a referendum on unilateral withdrawal instead of a personality contest and Kadima will plummet. That's the challenge facing the national camp. And it remains to be seen if the personalities running the campaigns of the national camp parties will realize that the retreat issue is their only solid hope to whittle down the support this essentially one-man party enjoys to what should be its natural size.

Play the corruption card? Polls show the public knows full well that Sharon  is corrupt but they don't care. Highlight commitment to social-welfare policy?  Make this the defining issue of the campaign and you are just another "me too". Remind voters about the lefties in Kadima?  It may convince some voters to "come home" but Sharon is running as the man on the horse who does what he wants, when he wants to, and could give a damn what anyone else says (or for that matter what he himself may have said before), so the composition of his party is of secondary importance. Israel loves this ultimate man on the horse. But Israel doesn't want the retreat Sharon is planning. A poll of a representative sample of 500 adult Israeli Jews carried out by Smith Research & Consulting on 29-30 November and sponsored by ZOA - The Zionist Organization of America - finds that 67% oppose carrying out a significant unilateral withdrawal from Judea and Samaria if it is not possible to advance in negotiations with the Palestinians on the basis of the Road Map after the elections because the PA fails to fight terror. Among those who indicated that they plan to vote for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's Kadima Party, 54% oppose and 37% support carrying out a significant unilateral withdrawal under those circumstances.

And the public sees retreat as a defining issue. A follow up question found that of those who oppose unilateral withdrawal under those circumstances, 75% responded that they would not vote for a party that would support such a move. Hammer the message home that a vote for Sharon is a vote for retreat and  there is nothing he can say that will convince voters that this isn't the case. Ironically, the very thing that appeals to Israelis: that he does what he wants, when he wants to, and could give a damn what anyone else says or what  he himself may have said before - would then be his Achilles heel.
 

PREVIOUS COMMENTARIES

Israel's Election Choice
                 

If all goes well and the survival instincts of the post-Sharon Likud bring  them to the realization that their only possible chance to beat Sharon is by "product differentiation" then the Israeli electorate may very well have a genuine opportunity to set the Jewish State's path at the ballot box. Labor, Sharon and Likud can offer the public distinctly different paths, each with its own distinct logic.

The Labor Party, headed by Amir Peretz, is genuinely convinced that withdrawal to the '67 lines will bring peace.  Period.  The heavy investment they plan to make in quick final status talks is not because they think such paperwork is really needed for peace but instead in order to come up with wording that will satisfy enough Israelis who don't share their faith to join in supporting the final status withdrawals .  And since, according to this faith, Arab violence will end the moment the last Israeli leaves the West Bank (and possibly the Golan), Palestinian security noncompliance before the actual withdrawal is irrelevant. The Sharon "Kadima" Party, or rather Ariel Sharon (the rest of the ticket is profoundly irrelevant) is genuinely convinced that Israel can unilaterally impose final status arrangements if it unilaterally withdraws to ostensibly final status borders.  The United States and even the European Union will give Sharon carte blanche, the argument goes, as long as he bulldozes enough Jewish communities in the West Bank. The Likud is genuinely convinced that Israel is better off managing the stalemate that insisting on Palestinian compliance before final status talks can be expected to entail.  By the same token, should conditions warrant Israel's engagement in final status talks Israel will enter those talks confident that the Jewish State's interests would be better served if the talks stalemate over final status terms rather than compromise on what it sees as vital Israeli interests and requirements. National Union and NRP also fit into this line of thought but with a more demanding perception of what are vital Israeli interests and requirements.

In many respects, the Labor-Peretz approach, being faith-based, has both the advantage and disadvantage of simplicity.  Accept the premise that withdrawal to the '67 lines will bring peace as axiomatic and the rest falls into place.  Reject that article of faith and the logic falls apart. The debate between the Sharon and Likud approaches is considerably more complicated as it requires not only deliberating Israel's vital interests but also assessing the limits Israel faces as it endeavors to pursue these interests under the two scenarios. Both camps can be expected to try to bolster their position by referring to the Gaza experience:  Supporters of the Sharon approach can point to the praise Israel earned for withdrawing while advocates of the Likud approach can point out that the Gaza model was based on 100% withdrawal and that that foreign praise did not translate into support for Israel's stand on security interests. The security fiasco known as "Agreement on Movement and Access" and "Agreed Principles For Rafah Crossing" that Israel was pressured by the Bush team to accept to fill the vacuum created by the retreat from Gaza serves as a stark reminder of just how fleeting the rewards are for retreating. On the other hand, with elections coming up in just a few months, retreat advocates can hope that the security consequences of the Gaza retreat won't play out before the votes are cast. It is hard to predict how the vote will ultimately be split between the three views. But at least this election may offer the opportunity for the  public to consider and choose between them.

Bush soft on Palestinian security compliance - approach disservice to all


To Mahmoud Abbas' credit, from the very first day he recognized that when it comes to the Palestinians, the Bush team isn't really serious about security compliance.  That the White House is more interested in the melody than the lyrics. That's why Abbas can consistently say flat out that he has no intention to confront the illegal armed militias and it doesn't matter. That's why Abbas could make it perfectly clear - as he stood next to President Bush in the White House today - that he has no intention to collect weapons before the elections.

And that's why Abbas can repeatedly explain that, at best, his idea of "one gun" is that ultimately all the terrorists generously agree to be on the PA's payroll. Sure, Mr. Bush talks the talk about the need for the Palestinians to fight terror - but his carefully crafted remarks, wrapped in praise for Abbas, are bereft of any clear timetable or measurable standards for action.

This is nothing new.

A few weeks ago Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice responded to a question at Princeton University about America being soft on Hamas with a carefully crafted statement that was not only soft on Hamas but soft on Palestinian terror in general. Instead of calling on the Palestinian Authority to immediately disarm the terrorists, Rice showed understanding for this taking an open-ended period of time.  "There are periods of time of transition in which one has to give some space to the participants, in this case the Palestinians, to begin to come to a new national compact. Eventually", the Secretary of State explained, they have to be disarmed. Paradoxically, rather than help Abbas, Mr. Bush is sending a message to the Palestinian street that there isn't any genuine pressure for the PA to take serious steps against the terror infrastructure.

The deleterious absence of pressure from Washington on the Palestinian leadership isn't limited to security matters.  The PLO could readily inject hundreds of millions of dollars from its "war chest" today to alleviate the situation in the Gaza Strip rather than hold out for contributions, but instead Washington acts as if Arafat took the PLO's holdings with him to his grave.

Operation of passage points - not a question of "if" but "how"

       
The suicide bombing in Hadera put a temporarily halt to the Bush Administration's growing campaign to push Israel to essentially abandon its security concerns vis-à-vis the operation of passages. But it is a very temporary halt. And for good reason.

Because, ultimately, the operation of the passages, the lifeblood of Gaza, isn't a question of "if" but "how". Unfortunately, the Palestinians have apparently succeeded in making the issue of the operation of the various passages more an issue of sovereignty than security, thus setting the stage to effectively strip Israel of the ability to insure that the Jewish State's security needs are not compromised by the operation of the passages. Israel shut down the passages today as it launched a security operation necessitated, as Prime Minister Ariel Sharon explained, by the refusal of the Palestinian Authority to act against the terrorists. And there is no reason to expect the PA to be any more serious when they operate passage points.

And Egypt?

Earlier this week Israeli officials complained that there is weapons smuggling from Egypt to Gaza at volumes well above pre-retreat levels thanks to Egypt's failure to take serious measures.

But what about foreign observers?

If one could expect the Palestinians and Egyptians to diligently operate passage points then foreign observers might be face saving window dressing for internal Israeli political purposes.  But it would be absurd to expect foreign observers to insure security when the Palestinian and Egyptian operators themselves are part of the problem - not the solution. An active Israeli role in the operation of passage points may not be pleasing to Palestinian eyes, but the alternative is a farce doomed to catastrophic failure.

Compensation for administrative detention

                 
The debate over administrative detention pits national security concerns against the rights of people who, while believed to represent serious security threats, for some reason cannot be charged and put on trial. Under the present system in Israel, those held in administrative detention  are not compensated for their loss of freedom - or even the financial  consequences of being unable to go to their workplaces. As a result, when the State weighs the costs of administrative detention  against the benefits in a given case they seriously understate the costs as  much of the costs are borne by the person being detained.

The recent court decision to award 100,000 NIS in damages to Noam Federman  for falsely placing him under house arrest is a step in the right direction,  but hardly enough.  At 100,000 NIS for two years that comes to less than  $1,000 a month. And, of course, the cost is being imposed after the fact.

Present security conditions may make administrative detention a necessary  evil but the introduction of financial  "checks and balances" so that  administrative detainees - both Israeli and Palestinian - are financially  compensated for their loss of freedom would go a long way to insuring that  security authorities think long and hard before resorting to what should be  an exceptional last resort.- 13 October 2005
 

Rice soft on Hamas and disarming Palestinian terrorists


Last week Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice responded to a question at Princeton University about America being soft on Hamas with a carefully crafted statement that was not only soft on Hamas but soft on Palestinian terror in general. Instead of calling on the Palestinian Authority to immediately disarm the terrorists, Rice showed understanding for this taking an open-ended period of time.  "There are periods of time of transition in which one has to give some space to the participants, in this case the Palestinians, to begin to come to a new national compact. Eventually", the Secretary of State explained, they have to be disarmed. Instead of calling to bar Hamas from running in the PLC unless it first disarms, Rice said that "you cannot have armed groups ultimately participating in politics with no expectation that they're going to disarm" - a requirement that could just as easily be met by Hamas saying that they "expect" to "ultimately" disarm.

And to drive home the point that the Hamas "politicians" can "run first - disarm sometime later", the Secretary of State cited the example of the Good Friday Agreement in which "it was understood that when Sinn Fein came into politics .eventually the IRA would disarm" - adding that "perhaps, hopefully, that process is now underway." One would have hoped that Ms. Rice's remarks would have been met by expressions of concern in both Israel and from friends of Israel in America.

The opposite was the case.

The Israeli media and Israeli politicians to a man embraced the Rice remarks as if they were a no-holds-barred position against the Hamas in general and their participation in the upcoming PLC elections in particular. "Improving" on Rice's remarks might make sense if doing so would somehow transform the forced interpretation into American policy.  But there is no indication that this is the case. By misrepresenting Ms. Rice's very serious remarks, Israel has sent a signal to friends of Israel that all is well in Washington when the opposite is the case.  And with Mahmoud Abbas slated to meet President Bush in the coming weeks this is hardly the time to replace serious concerns with wishful thinking.